Wealth Strategies
On Uncertainty, Instability Of Financial Markets
What can investors do to assess and understand their portfolios’ vulnerability to future violent volatility fluctuations?
There are different ways to view investments and risks.
Technology firms that serve wealth managers by giving them and
their clients a way to view portfolio risk are in an interesting
place to comment. One such organisation is Finvent
Software Solutions. Here Yannis Sardis, director, talks about
the uncertainties and volatilities in markets. (To understand the
KlarityRisk
references below, in 2018, Finvent, regional distributor and
service provider of SS&C Advent Software, entered into a
majority shareholding position with KlarityRisk, a multi-asset
class solution for market risk, portfolio construction, limits
monitoring and investment decision analytics for the
buy-side.)
The editors are glad to share these views and invite readers to
jump into the conversation. The usual editorial disclaimers
apply. Email tom.burroughes@wealthbriefing.com
and jackie.bennion@clearviewpublishing.com
Extreme market events are evidently more frequent than commonly
thought, therefore their effects on portfolio performance should
be diligently risk-adjusted by investors in order to create
defensive portfolio re-balancing action for a wide spectrum of
unexpected shocks.
“Think not of what you see, but what it took to produce what
you see,” Benoit Mandelbrot, mathematician and creator
of Fractal Geometry, said.
With the exception of portfolio performance, no other investment
notion has flooded the financial press and the minds of investors
as dominantly as that of market volatility. The most common quote
for volatility is the statistical dispersion of returns for a
security or a market index, represented by the variance or
standard deviation.
In February 2020, a prolonged period of equity price appreciation
came to an abrupt end. Extremely low levels of stock market
volatility, paired with very low interest rates motivated
investors to retain high equity exposures and become increasingly
complacent with the brewing risks of their portfolios. The lack
of short-term market volatility was deciphered as a vivid
indication of market stability and investors jumped on the
bandwagon in fear of missing out (or FOMO, as now popularly
cited).
Between 19 February and 23 March, the S&P 500 Index dropped
from 3,386 to 2,237, a correction of 34 per cent. In the same
period, the VIX “fear” Index jumped by 328 per cent. A spreading
COVID-19 pandemic had triggered a massive increase in market
volatility within a few trading days. The price reversion was so
quick and violent that the less attentive investors had no time
to react.
Could investors have predicted the imminent market reckoning in
advance and reallocated capital into non-affected assets or cash,
thus preserving their capital through this turbulence? No, not in
a consistent and repetitive fashion. The two defining
characteristics of future change are the existence of wild
volatility and the impossibility of predicting it. The mission of
those involved in asset management is not to predict the future
but to manage their positions of high conviction within a
disciplined risk framework.
Monetary easing and government bailouts employed by the world’s
central banks may prevent certain businesses from going under
(often temporarily), but they also increase the possibility of a
system-wide collapse. Artificially suppressing short-term
volatility weakens complex systems, encourages excessive
risk-taking and creates a false sense of stability, while in
reality it only increases long-term risks at the expense of
short-term vulnerable market price growth.
Such volatility-reduction policy mechanisms combined with
collective market behavioural psychology (false stability) and
investor inertia (FOMO) may also cause volatility to cluster,
meaning that large volatility bursts tend to happen more
infrequently but at successive over-sized amounts. Empirically,
this phenomenon can be thought of as a system’s reaction to
defuse and mean-revert an artificially suppressed pressure.
What then can investors do to assess and understand their
portfolios’ vulnerability to future violent volatility
fluctuations? How can one test and simulate the behaviour and
loss-tolerance of a multi-asset-class portfolio for the
“occasional” 328 per cent increase in stock price volatility?
In addition to creating portfolio stress-test simulations based
on past historical crises
(https://www.fwreport.com/article.php?id=187395#.XwRY120zaUm),
one can adjust such “worst case” scenarios to modern frameworks
via customised portfolio stress-testing which allow user-defined
changes to the portfolio’s driving risk factors.
The graph below demonstrates an example of a KlarityRisk
customised factor-based stress-testing concept at work, for a
global multi-asset, multi-currency diversified portfolio. The
model portfolio is over-weighted towards US equities, with its
remaining balance allocated to Europe, the UK and Japan. The
analysis simulates a user-defined volatility increase of 20 per
cent on its US equity holdings and depicts the VaR changes at
portfolio level (the maximum potential portfolio loss over a
given period, under a confidence level) and the contribution of
each asset class to the total portfolio VaR.
Importantly, when the user increases the US equity volatility by
20 per cent but makes no changes to the volatility of the other
asset classes, KlarityRisk uses the correlations between the US
equities and each other asset class, for the measurement period,
to adjust the volatility values of the latter. The final output
thus represents a holistic stress effect of the portfolio to
factor changes. KlarityRisk utilises a wide range of critical
risk factors to perform similar stress-test simulation
scenarios.
Furthermore, KlarityRisk can produce a pre-test and post-stress
risk decomposition of the portfolio for an exhaustive list of
categorisations such as asset class, sector, industry, risk
country, reference currency and issuer credit rating, thus
effectively identifying any imbalances between individual
position weights and their associated risks.