Compliance
The Case For Handling AML Controls At EU Level
![The Case For Handling AML Controls At EU Level](http://www.wealthbriefing.com/cms/images/app/General%20Extra/120210.jpg)
The author of this article, an academic and a former central bank official, says while AML supervision remains in the hands of national member states, the euro remains vulnerable to threats from the East and erratic behaviour from the West.
This article examines the argument – which is likely to prove controversial on some levels – as to why supervision of anti-money laundering controls needs to be conducted at a European Union level within the bloc. Recent controversies have focused attention on controls in certain nations. Panicos Demetriades, who is Professor of Financial Economics at the University of Leicester and the former Governor of the Central Bank of Cyprus, brings considerable experience to the field. This publication is pleased to share his views with readers; it does not endorse all views of outside contributors and invites readers to respond. Email tom.burroughes@wealthbriefing.com
A recent announcement by the European Banking Authority (EBA)
that it found “general and systematic shortcomings” in Malta’s
application of anti-money-laundering rules has exposed yet
another weakness in the euro area’s financial architecture.
So far, the debate on the completion of the banking union has
focused almost exclusively on the completion of its third pillar
– deposit insurance. That is because it is widely believed that
the first and second pillars - banking supervision and
banking resolution - have already been completed with the
creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single
Resolution Mechanism (SRM).
SSM, in fact, has the authority to supervise all banks in the
euro area. There is, however, one exception: supervision of AML.
That has remained in the hands of member states, partly as a
result of political objections based on national security
considerations. AML supervision can, therefore, vary widely
within the euro area and, as the Maltese case has shown, can fall
well below expected standards.
“So what?” you might ask. Surely indiscretions in a small country
like Malta wouldn’t matter all that much?
Or would they? The notion that such indiscretions do not matter
can be easily refuted by looking at what happened in the case of
ABLV bank, the third largest bank in Latvia that failed because
of actions taken by the US Treasury arising out of money
laundering “concerns”. Daniele Nouy, chair of SSM admitted that
the ABLV affair was “embarrassing” for the ECB and was quick to
call for EU-level authorities to be given AML
powers.
Reputational considerations are of course very important, more so
for relatively young central banks like the ECB on whose
reputation the future of the euro rests.
But the Latvian case demonstrated several deeper flaws in the
euro’s financial architecture. First, that Europe cannot rely on
the US for actions against money laundering, not just because US
intelligence may not always get it right, but also because such
actions may reflect US political biases. Second, it has also
demonstrated that AML failures can have implications for
financial stability, banking supervision and bank resolution –
all of which are key elements of the banking union. Combine the
two together and it’s like handing over financial stability in
the euro area to the US.
Last but not least, the Latvian case has demonstrated that even
the national security objection to centralizing AML may be
seriously flawed, especially if the biggest security threats to
the euro area are common. Indeed, the ABLV affair suggests they
might be, as the money laundering “concerns” were linked to
Russian deposits. Assuming the US Treasury “concerns” about ABLV
were valid, they suggest that the Latvian AML supervisor failed,
even though Latvia is a country that is acutely aware of the
security threat from the East.
Regulators in small member states with large banking systems are,
in fact, vulnerable to capture by powerful financial interests,
as are the media and the political process. The story of the
Cyprus crisis is a case in point, and it is also linked to the
same threat from the East.
During 2005-11 the Cypriot banking system doubled in size,
largely because of the influx of Russian and Ukrainian deposits,
facilitated by politically connected law firms. The
abundant liquidity in Cypriot banks resulted in a credit boom and
a real estate bubble, as well as reckless investments outside
Cyprus (e.g. the purchase of Greek Government bonds and a top-ten
retail bank in Russia).
Part of the problem was that the “ruling elite” of Cyprus became
dependent on Russian and Ukrainian money and resisted any attempt
at tightening regulation. When the banks suffered
massive losses from their bond and loan portfolio, Cyprus was
forced to apply for financial assistance from Europe and the
IMF.
As part of that, the country undertook - reluctantly - a
major restructuring of its banking system. The restructuring
programme addressed nominally the regulatory failings that led to
the crisis and included an apparent tightening of the AML
framework and supervision. But the programme has not
addressed the deeper cause of the crisis: state capture by a
ruling elite content to accumulate wealth by continuing to serve
the needs of Russia and its oligarchs. The restructuring, in
fact, resulted in toxic political fallout that eroded the central
bank’s independence. In the second half of 2013,
notwithstanding an ECB legal opinion advising to the contrary,
legislative changes were enacted that shifted powers away
from the Governor, whose independence is protected by the Treaty,
onto the Board of Directors that can be subject to political
influence. Russian influence on Cyprus, has, if anything,
increased since 2014 and the effectiveness of AML supervision
remains doubtful.
Why this can be problematic for Europe – and indeed the United
States - is illustrated by what is perhaps the most infamous case
of money-laundering to date: that of Paul Manafort, former
campaign manager of Donald Trump, who used Laiki, the second
largest bank in Cyprus, to launder millions of dollars from his
work advising Ukraine’s former pro-Russian President Victor
Yanukovych.
Manafort has been indicted as part of the Mueller investigation
into possible Russian influence in the American presidential
election not only for money laundering but also for acting as an
“unregistered agent of a foreign country”. While Cyprus can
proudly point to the fact that Manafort’s bank account was closed
in 2013 because of suspected money laundering, the indictment
makes reference to two “loan” transactions from Cyprus in 2014
and 2015 totalling $1.9 million. These large transactions, which
are unlikely to go under the AML radar of any well supervised
bank, cast considerable doubt on the effectiveness of AML
supervision by Cyprus, notwithstanding the improvements promoted
in 2013-2014.
By contrast, Cyprus took firm and decisive action against a small
but fiercely competitive branch of a foreign bank in the summer
of 2014, following a preliminary US Treasury finding that the
bank was of “primary money laundering concern”. The bank,
however, had nothing to do with the Manafort affair and indeed no
evidence was ever provided by the US Treasury to substantiate its
“concerns”. The bank’s Lebanese owners claim that
they have been scapegoated – they believe their bank may have
been a “sacrificial lamb” to convince the outside world that
Cyprus is taking drastic action to tackle money
laundering.
Rulings by Cypriot Courts have certainly gone against the action
of the central bank. Specifically, the District Court has found
that “the special liquidation of FBME [proposed by the central
bank] was not proven to be in the public interest”, a ruling also
upheld more recently by Cyprus’ Supreme Court.
While AML supervision remains in the hands of national member
states, the euro remains vulnerable to threats from the East and
erratic behaviour from the West. Small states with large banking
systems like Cyprus, Malta, and Latvia are particularly
vulnerable as they are susceptible to state capture by powerful
financial interests. The ECB cannot rely on the effectiveness of
national supervisors to safeguard the integrity, stability and
reputation of the euro area from these threats.